

## Part TWO

# Report

## Houthi Secret Organization in International Organizations and Funds

Investigation on the Relatives of Houthi Leaders in International Organizations

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## Part TWO

### Houthi Secret Organization in International Organizations and Funds

#### Introduction

Attached to the first part, this is a second part of a report that deals with a detailed analysis of a number of prominent Houthi figures who play pivotal roles in international and local institutions in Yemen, with a focus on the ways in which these figures serve the Houthi militia, as well as their influence on the decisions and policies of the institutions in which they operate. We will review job roles, family relationships, and concrete examples of their influences on international funding and projects.

The report addresses the role of a number of personalities, one of the figures in the Public Relations and Communication Department at the United Nations Office for Humanitarian Affairs in Sana'a (UNOCHA), where he facilitates communications, meetings and messages with UN organizations and local institutions, which promotes the interests of the Houthis in issues such as the Safer ship and the receipt of the alternative ship Nautica, and enables them to finance, employ relatives and coordinate for the benefit of the militia in projects. It also highlights two figures working to improve the image of the Houthis in the West through the They coordinate activities and reports with Mwatana and international human rights organizations to issue reports that distort legitimacy, in addition to participating in defending the Houthis in the meetings of the Human Rights Council in Geneva.

The report explores the role of a figure who acts as an audit and governance specialist at the World Bank, colluding with the Houthis to cover up financial corruption and manipulation of evidence, enabling them to obtain significant funding and manipulate the currency exchange rate on projects. It also addresses the role of a figure who oversees UNICEF's water, sanitation and sanitation projects, coordinating with the Houthis and corrupt people to implement ineffective and corrupt projects.

Finally, the report discusses the role of a figure working at the Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance, where he holds meetings and meetings with European ambassadors and the UN envoy, provides internal information and advice to them, facilitates meetings and participates in international conferences, and organizes conferences and meetings related to Yemen tribes and directs them to serve Houthi interests in a hidden way.

This report aims to highlight the conflicts of interest and misuse of international resources by these figures, and their impact on the humanitarian and economic situation in Yemen, while calling for measures to hold those involved accountable and ensure transparency in the management of international aid and projects.

## 1. Seventh Person: Najib Ali Hassan Al-Mansour



Najib Ali Hassan Al-Mansour is the Director of Public Relations and Communications at the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in Sana'a (1, 2, 3). His role includes overseeing all communications, meetings, and messages, including those with international organizations and local institutions, and communicating with Sharia officials. The information we have obtained raises significant concerns about potential conflicts of interest and the safety of operations within the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) in Sana'a.

Concerns center on the fact that some of al-Mansour's relatives hold prominent positions within the Houthi leadership. Specifically, Yasser Abdul Karim al-Mansour, who is mentioned as the head of the Houthi-affiliated General Investment Authority (4), was previously an accountant at Total in Sana'a. The main concern is that Najib al-Mansour is using his position at the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) to benefit the Houthi militia. Such as facilitating the replacement of the Safer with Nautica Keeping the two ships as an environmental threat to Yemen and the world in the hands of the Houthis, as well as facilitating the provision of funds, and enabling the Houthi militia to obtain two bombs in the middle of Yemeni territorial waters and threatening the environment and Yemeni citizens. This is in addition to employing relatives in

United Nations institutions and the Office of the United Nations Humanitarian Representative in Yemen, and working to coordinate projects and transfer data and information for the benefit of the Houthi militia.

The Department of Relations and Liaison at the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) plays a critical role in coordination and cooperation, both internally and externally. If this administration is infiltrated, it could undermine the entire operations of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in Yemen in favor of the Houthi militia. Al-Mansour's involvement in serving the interests of the Houthi militia could mean dishonesty and abuse of his position for personal or militia gain.

A crucial question arises as to whether legitimacy officials are aware of Mansour's actions and affiliations. If not, this raises serious questions about oversight and accountability within the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and associated governmental and non-governmental bodies. The situation also indicates corruption and conflicts of interest within the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). It is important to determine whether the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs has ignored these issues or whether there is any internal investigation. In addition, we have already published information on the FraudWiki platform about the doctorate degree that Al-Mansour obtained from a fake university (5), which further calls into question his credibility and qualifications for his position.

In summary, it is necessary to address several key concerns and questions: whether legitimacy officials are aware of al-Mansour's actions and affiliations with the Houthi militia; whether OCHA conducted any internal investigations into potential conflicts of interest and corruption related to al-Mansour and his relatives; the impact of al-Mansour's actions on overall humanitarian efforts and the integrity of OCHA's operations in Yemen; and whether OCHA verified al-Mansour's educational qualifications; Under the claim that he holds a fake doctorate. Addressing these concerns is vital to ensure the transparency, accountability and effectiveness of humanitarian operations in Yemen. The situation calls for a thorough investigation and corrective action if necessary to maintain the integrity of the mission and operations of the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.

## 2. Eighth Person: Amiruddin Jahaf

## 3. Ninth Person: Ayman Al-Mansour



Amiruddin Jahaf (6) and Ayman al-Mansour, through Ensan (7), play an active role in promoting the Houthi agenda locally and internationally. This entity is closely linked to the Houthis and works to enhance their image in the West. Their efforts are in line with the activities and reports issued by Mwatana Organization led by Radhia Al-Mutawakel (8, 9). Mwatana's reports often distort the legitimacy of the Yemeni government and reinforce the Houthi narrative. Jahaf and al-Mansour also coordinate their activities with the Arabic Organization for Human Rights, which is headed by Ahmed al-Shami and Mohammed al-Wazir.

In 2019, Ayman Al-Mansour participated in the 40th session of the Human Rights Council meeting in Geneva (10), defending the Houthis and condemning the Yemeni government. The event also included a speech by Abdul Qader Al-Murtada, a war criminal known for his involvement in the torture of prisoners, in which he addressed the Council via the Internet, in cooperation and coordination with Mohamed Reda Al-Wazir, founder of the Arabic Organization for Human Rights (ARWA), whose name was mentioned in the report of the first part of this series of the secret organization of the Houthis in international organizations and funds.

Amir al-Din Jahaf, in addition to his role in Insan, is also a prominent Houthi leader. (See reference 6) It uses the organization as a front to promote the Group's goals under the guise of humanitarian and civil society work. Despite being detained in Marib earlier, Jahaf was released, continuing his activities unabated.

Ayman al-Mansour has a family relationship with Najib Ali al-Mansour, Director of Relations, Communication and Outreach at the United Nations Office for Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) in Sana'a. This relationship raises additional concerns about potential conflicts of interest and the extent of Houthi influence within international organizations. Najib Ali al-Mansour's involvement in humanitarian affairs, as mentioned earlier,

further complicates the narrative, suggesting a potential network of influence that benefits the Houthis internally and externally.

There are also links to Amir al-Din Jahaf and activities through **the DeepRoot Foundation** and the Hikma program, which follows Raafat Al-Akhali and his wife Abeer Al-Mutawakel as well as Alaa Qassem, where **DeepRoot** is one of the soft hands of the Houthi militia, which opposed the classification of the Houthi militia as a terrorist group during the period of US President Trump. Unfortunately, this institution is practicing its activities in the areas of legitimacy and received million dollar funds in the name of peace and justice, and what is surprising is that its director Raafat Al-Akhali refuses to abide by the law that He claims and refused to attend the Marib court and is currently being tried as a fugitive defendant from justice and was informed through a number of judicial announcements on page 9 of the official September 26 newspaper (11)

Together, Al-Jahaf and Al-Mansour play an important role in promoting the Houthi cause, hiding their true intentions under the forefront of legitimate humanitarian efforts and international advocacy. Their actions and affiliations highlight the complex interplay between local conflicts and international diplomatic efforts, raising doubts about the integrity of some humanitarian and human rights organizations working in Yemen.

#### 4. Tenth Person: Waleed Hamoud Ali Al-Najjar



Waleed Hamoud Ali Al-Najjar is an Audit and Governance Specialist in Public Financial Management at the World Bank in Washington (12, 13). He is also responsible for writing project proposals and reviewing and issuing audited financial reports on project implementation in Yemen. However, his role carries a major conflict

of interest, as his father, Hamoud Ali Al-Najjar, is a member of the Board of Directors of the Central Bank in Sana'a, which is affiliated with the Houthis (14)

Auditing international NGOs is critical to preventing corruption and fraud. However, some corrupt auditors collude with international organizations operating in Yemen and with the militia to cover up the looting of funds, allowing them to evade accountability for the misuse of public funds. In such cases, auditors become false witnesses, supporting the practices of Houthi militia members by manipulating evidence and fabricating financial statements without execution. Real audit procedures.

Vetting officials of international organizations loyal to the Houthi dynasty play a crucial role in this process. They are working tirelessly to expose the corruption of these organizations while at the same time covering up the Houthis' continued looting of aid funds. When there is a conflict of interest, these reports become tools to cover up corruption and ensure that funds continue to flow to the Houthi militias.

Waleed al-Najjar's involvement seems to be in line with this pattern, as it serves the interests of his father's Houthi militia. Examples of World Bank projects in Yemen, whether in agriculture or education, reveal that these funds went directly to the militias through UN organizations, and this is a major violation in addition to not entering through the Central Bank of the legitimacy in Aden, not to mention the manipulation of the currency exchange rate, which was calculated in these projects from 250 riyals to the dollar, while these projects seemed Some in 2015 and some in 2017 and continued to work for the Houthis until after 2021. (15, 16, 17, 18, 19)

Waleed al-Najjar is accused of covering up this corruption, either by reviewing or writing fabricated audit reports for international organizations operating in Yemen and the Houthi militia. His actions ignore the suffering of the Yemeni people, and hide the manipulation and looting of humanitarian aid funds, whether through huge operational budgets or by covering the manipulation of the currency exchange difference between the areas of legitimacy and the areas controlled by the militia, in addition to covering The Houthi militia looted and seized tens of billions of dollars of money given to Yemen. This example highlights the broader issue of hacked audits, which enable the ongoing misappropriation of international aid by corrupt entities affiliated with the Houthi militia.

## 5. Eleventh Person: Ahlam Almutawakel



Ahlam Almutawakel has been working as UNICEF's Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) Programme Officer since 2016 (20, 21 and 22) In this role, she oversees all WASH projects in Yemen, which have an annual budget of sometimes up to \$200 million (23, 24). Aden and the emergency sewage plant in Marib.

Al-Mutawakel's communications raise significant concerns about conflicts of interest and corruption. She has family ties to Taha Al-Mutawakel, the Houthi Minister of Health (25), and Radhya Al-Mutawakel, owner of the pro-Houthi Mwatana Foundation. In addition, Abeer Al-Mutawakel, Director of the Hikma Program and wife of Raafat Al-Akhali, Director of DeepRoot, who we have previously discussed in previous reports for his prominent role in serving the Houthi militia, in addition to the Deputy Chairman of the Anti-Corruption Commission of the Houthis Redan Al-Mutawakel (26) He is a relative of Ahlam as well as a brother of Redan Al-Mutawakel, and sources report his role in covering the corruption of UNICEF in many cases related to the corruption of water projects and health facilities associated with UNICEF.

Under the supervision of Ahlam Al-Mutawakel, the water and sanitation sector supports various projects run by the Houthis from Sana'a, including the Urban Cities Project linked to the Ministry of Water and Environment. The minister of this ministry in the legitimate government is Tawfiq al-Sharjabi. The salaries of some of his close aides, as well as some employees in Aden, were found to be paid in dollars by Houthi sources in Sana'a. This has been reported since 2020 (27), and includes figures such as Munir al-Aghbari, Sharjabi's private secretary, and Arwa al-Hammadi, director of the Aden Urban Cities Project, whose salary is also paid from

Sana'a. In addition, Tawfiq Al-Sharjabi was Undersecretary of the Ministry and used to go secretly to Jordan and give approval to the United Nations Special Plan for Water and Sanitation without the knowledge of the minister in the period (2017-2018 ).

## 6. Twelfth Person: Khaldoun Mohamed Al-Wajeih Bakahail



Khaldoun Mohamed Al-Wajeih Bakahil, a former student of Mohammed Azzan, founder of the Houthi Believing Youth Organization (28), is the Strategic Advisor and Senior Coordinator for Yemen at the Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance (DCAF) (29, 30). Bakhil's contacts with the Houthi leadership are extensive and significant (31). He is also married to the daughter of Ahmed al-Kahlani, 32, who is the brother of Ali al-Kahlani, the Houthis' assistant defense minister. In addition, he is associated with Fouad al-Kahlani, senior adviser to the International Monetary Fund in Washington, and his uncles include prominent figures from the Hamdani family, such as Taha and Abdulhadi al-Hamdani (33).

Bakahil's background includes preparing him from a young age to support the Houthi cause, although presenting himself under a different guise to avoid suspicion. This connection was highlighted recently when his teacher Mohamed Azzan, founder of the Believing Youth Organization, appeared at a seminar in Jordan in May 2024, organized by **DeepRoot**, led by Raafat Al-Akhali and his wife Abeer Al-Mutawakel, in partnership with the European Union and Alaa Qassem from Resonate Yemen (34), and this is not the first time that **DeepRoot**, organized and engaged with Houthi leaders, referred in the first part of this series to a seminar held with Ahmed Al-Shami, a Houthi leader and member of the Houthi Economic Committee, and DeepRoot Al-Shami appeared as the director of the Arabic Organization for Human Rights.

In his role at the Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance (DCAF), Bakahil meets with European ambassadors, the UN envoy, and even the Iranian ambassador to the IAEA (35, 36, 37, 38). These meetings ostensibly serve multiple purposes, including coordinating public relations and publicity, facilitating strategic meetings, and providing internal advice and useful information to the Houthi group.

Furthermore, through the Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance (DCAF), Bakahil organizes conferences related to Yemeni tribes, which are often held in Switzerland (39) or Germany. These meetings are suspected of involving undeclared activities in support of Houthi interests. The Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance (DCAF) **also has** partnerships with organizations such as **DeepRoot**, the Sana'a Centre for Strategic Studies, and the European Peace Institute (EIP), raising further questions about the extent of their involvement in Houthi-related activities.

There are significant concerns about the legitimacy and awareness of the Yemeni government and international stakeholders about these details. The fact that Khaldoun Bakhil, with his deep ties to the Houthi leadership, holds an important position at the Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance (DCAF) and participates in influential meetings, raises questions about potential collusion and oversight failures. It seems unlikely that European and American sources are unaware of Bakahil's background and affiliations, given his history with the founder of the Believing Youth Organization. This situation requires careful scrutiny to ensure that international aid is not undermined and that covert efforts to support Houthi agendas are not undermined by such individuals.

## 7. How did these elements use their influence and presence in international organizations to serve the Houthi militia?

These elements have strategically exploited their influence and presence within international organizations to support the Houthi militia through various complex means. Their positions allowed them to shape contacts and influence UN projects as well as influence and exploit the UN envoy to exert pressure on legitimacy, providing the Houthis with increased opportunities to secure support and assistance. Moreover, they have actively worked to improve the image of the Houthis in the Western world by cooperating with international human rights institutions and allying with organizations that defended the Houthis in international forums.

This concerted effort aims to portray the Houthis as legitimate and persecuted, promote international sympathy and support for their cause, and facilitate access to funding.

### 1.7. Formation of telecommunications and UN projects for the benefit of the Houthis

One of the mechanisms used by these elements included exerting influence on international communications and projects. Specifically, their positions within the Public Relations and Communications Department of the UN Office for Humanitarian Affairs in Sana'a have given them an important role in shaping UN communications and projects to align with Houthi interests. By capitalizing on their positions, they promoted the Houthi agenda, manipulated information reaching international bodies, and played a major role in improving the Houthis' image before the international community. In addition, they have facilitated Houthi access to humanitarian aid, ensuring it reaches them even at the expense of those most in need.

### 2.7. Enhancing the image of the Houthis in the Western world

Another way these elements have sought to advance the Houthi cause is by improving their image in the West. They established organizations in Western countries and participated in joint activities and reports with international human rights institutions. In intensive cooperation with organizations defending the Houthis in international forums, they aimed to improve perception of the Houthis as legitimate and oppressed. These concerted efforts have succeeded in mobilizing international sympathy and support for the Houthi cause.

### 3.7. Manipulation of financial audit and corruption coverage

These elements used tactics related to financial auditing and corruption cover-up. Notably, the World Bank's audit and governance specialist played a pivotal role in concealing financial corruption, manipulating reports on behalf of the Houthis , and covering up the corruption of international organizations in Yemen that

participate and support the Houthis. As a result, this illegal exploitation has harmed funded projects and undermined its intended objectives.

#### 4.7. Misallocation of funds in the water and sanitation sector

In the area of funding, particularly in the water and sanitation sector, a UNICEF staff member played an important role in facilitating access to and monitoring of funds. Unfortunately, this official's involvement in coordination with the Houthis and corrupt individuals has led to the misallocation of funds allocated to water and sanitation projects. As a result, many of these projects have failed to achieve their desired goals due to the transfer of funds to the Houthis.

#### 5.7. Hidden support and priority for the Houthi perspective in international coordination

A strategic advisor and senior coordinator for Yemen at the Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance (DCSG), which has close ties to the Houthi militia, has strengthened the Houthi position through undisclosed means. This person has used his role in international meetings and conferences to support the militia and promote its agenda in global forums. These measures have contributed significantly to strengthening the position of the Houthis and supporting them in the international arena. In addition, through the joint work between the Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance (DCAF) and the European Peace Institute (EIP), it is necessary to look at the suspicious and security questionnaires distributed by the European Institute for Peace to the population and displaced persons in the legitimate areas through a project related to climate change. The European Institute's advisers loyal to the Houthi militia, such as Hisham al-Omeisy and Suad al-Salahi, should also be investigated.

## 6.7. UN envoy and failure to address Houthi violations

The UN envoy has always been complicit with the Houthis either by silence and failure to address the many violations committed by the Houthis. These violations include preventing the legitimate government from exporting crude oil, waging an economic war against legitimacy leading to a significant devaluation of the national currency, preventing the circulation of the national currency, and engaging in actions that have caused monetary division. The UN envoy's lack of response to these issues raises questions about his neutrality and commitment to addressing Houthi violations.

The role and efforts of the members of the Houthi secret organization are evident in international organizations and funds, where they exercise their roles to alleviate the suffering of the Houthi group. A clear example of this influence was also highlighted by the urgent letter sent by UN envoy Hans Grundberg to pressure legitimacy to stop the Central Bank's actions against their "spoiled son," the Houthis. This clearly shows how international influence is used to intervene in financial policies in favor of the Houthi movement, and highlights the significant role that pro-Houthi people play within global organizations in supporting and promoting Houthi interests.

United Nations  
Office of the Special Envoy of the  
Secretary-General for Yemen



الأمم المتحدة  
مكتب المبعوث الخاص للأمين العام  
للأمم المتحدة إلى اليمن

فخيمة الكاكرو ريشا العائدي  
رئيس مجلس البعثة الدائري

10 آذار/أبريل 2024

فخيمة الرئيس.

أكتب اليك خطي هذا بأعلى درجات الاستعجال ولقد بشأن القرار الذي اتخذته البنك المركزي اليمني مؤخراً رقم 30 لعام 2024 الذي يمتنع بتخليق كراخيص ستة برونك وما تبعه من تواصل مع البنك المرسله ونظام سويفت الذي يمتنعني إلى وقف وصول تلك البنوك إلى البنك المرسله ونظام سويفت.

إني أقر ما لحصلته الحكومة من مطالب اقتصادية منذ وقت طويل لكثرتها ظهوراً وأقف صناديرت القطر العام، لكن هذه القرارات الصادرة مؤخراً بشأن البنوك سوف توقع الضرر بالاقتصاد اليمني ويستند على المبررين البسطاء مماثلتهم في كل المراء البلاد، وقد تؤدي إلى خطر التصعيد الذي قد يتبعه إلى المجال العسكري.

من هذا نقادياً لكثيرين منخرطين بتصفاة خطراً على الاقتصاد اليمني، ولتساعده في الجهود الرامية لإطلاق الحوار، أمت الحكومة اليمنية والبنك المركزي اليمني على تعيين لجنة هذه القرارات، على الأقل إلى نهاية شهر أغسطس/آب، كما أود أن أطلب اليك إبلاغ هذا التعليل إلى جميع البنوك المرسله ونظام سويفت وتوجيههم بتأجيل أي إجراءات قد يكون لها تأثير سلبي في هذه البنوك الستة.

أعكرك أيضاً على دعم البدء بحوار تحت رعاية الأمم المتحدة بين الأطراف المعنية لمناقشة التطورات الاقتصادية التي وقعت مؤخراً في اليمن بهدف حلها بما يتناسب في مصلحة جميع اليمنيين وبما يتسمم مع العافية والروح المشتورة للالتزامات التي التفتت الأطراف اليمنية عليها، وسوف يرسل مكنتي إلى المخاورين المعنيين ضمن الحكومة اليمنية وكذلك ضمن البنك المركزي اليمني تفصيلياً أكثر حول هذا الحوار بما فيها جدول الأعمال.

إني أتمنى على دعمك الكامل لضمان حسن سير هذا الحوار إما فيه من مساهمة لليمنيين كافة وللمساهمة على خارطة الطريق، كما أنني أواصل مع المصارف أيضاً للتوصل على التزامهم بهذا الحوار.

وتفليماً لغاشتك وفق الاحترام والتقدير.

هانس كرونبرج  
المبعوث الخاص للأمين العام للأمم المتحدة إلى اليمن

نسخة:

مساعد البنك المركزي اليمني، البنك المركزي-صنع

In the current context, the swift actions of UN envoy Hans Grundberg to save the Houthis from decisions taken by the internationally recognized central bank resemble the actions of his predecessor, Martin Griffiths, who rushed to save the militia from losing the city of Hodeidah and its port in 2018. They have worked through the presence of some of the elements mentioned earlier, such as Ahmed Al-Shami, who works closely with the Office of the UN Envoy in forming and exerting pressure through it on the legitimacy and in the interest of the Houthi militia, and the latest example of this is the letter of the UN envoy to the legitimacy several days ago requesting the suspension of the procedures of the Central Bank in Aden (40). This raises concerns about complacency by both the United States and the international community, as the Houthi militia's actions should have received more attention and scrutiny much earlier.

One of the most important basic points in the codes of conduct and ethics of the United Nations organizations, which must be avoided and written a commitment to that when hiring is what is related to conflict of interest, fraud and exploitation of the position (41), and here unfortunately all these wrong and unethical behaviors are represented by those who have been mentioned in this report for the second part as well as in the first part with the clarity of their support for the Houthi militia in light of the silence of the international organizations in which they work, but went beyond that to exert pressure from Before these organizations, as well as the UN envoy, the legitimate government must implement the agendas of the Houthi militia and intervene in its favor in order to alleviate it with the arguments of the humanitarian paper, which the United Nations does not remember except when the Houthi militia is in a crisis situation.

## Conclusion

In conclusion, this analysis highlighted the harmful roles played by many key individuals in facilitating the interests and agenda of the Houthi militia through their positions within international organizations and bodies. Instead of maintaining neutrality and integrity, some have exploited their roles to the militia's advantage and obscured its abuses. Their actions have directly undermined the integrity and objectives of institutions such as the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and development programmes. Close ties with the Houthi leadership also call into question whether neutral

humanitarian priorities are prioritized over partisan political goals. Such behavior threatens to severely damage aid effectiveness and trust in interventions.

Financial manipulation has exposed further concerns about diverting donor funds away from the targeted beneficiaries. This means that there are significant oversight lapses in recruitment, staff control and conflict of interest safeguards. The practices of these elements together indicate the deliberate infiltration of international mechanisms and their selection in ways that have strengthened the position of the Houthis. Urgent thinking is warranted to prevent the recurrence of these vulnerabilities from being exploited at the expense of the population.

It is clear that the lenient positions of UN agencies have allowed Houthi liaison networks to continue unchecked for a long time, enabling the Houthis to continue their futile war against the Yemeni people.

Looking to the future, it is necessary to take concrete steps to confront the recurrence of such crimes, maintain impartiality in practice in international institutions and restore the initiative to the legitimate Government. The interests of the Yemeni people should be the compass in all reform efforts and future justice for the Yemeni people suffering from this protracted disaster.

This also requires the presidency and the legitimate government to open the door for accountability and accountability for ministers and ministries concerned with dealing with international organizations, whether the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its ambassadors, as well as the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, the Ministry of Water and Environment, the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor and the Ministry of Human Rights, and also work to hold accountable the civil society institutions that appeared in this report and the previous report and work in areas of legitimacy such as DeepRoot . And Raneen Yemen, Sana'a Center and Mwatana, and contributes to supporting the militias and participating with figures loyal to the Houthis in organizing many international events in addition to their support for the Houthis by mobilizing efforts to reject and cancel decisions that may lead to the classification of the Houthi militia among the terrorist groups, always invoking the "humanitarian situation of the Yemeni people."

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