


Report

Houthi Secret Organization in International Organizations and Funds

Investigation on the Relatives of Houthi Leaders in International Organizations



By:

Dr. Abdulqader Alkharraz

Partners: FraudWiki & P.T.O.C Yemen

June 2024

Contents	Page
Houthi Secret Organization in International Organizations and Funds	3
Introduction	3
1. First person: Fouad Ali Al-Kohlani	4
2. Second person: Safaa Ali Qasim Almoayad	5
3. Third person: Angham Hassan Al-Shami	6
4. Fourth person: Ahmed Al-Shami	7
5. Fifth person: Muhammad Al-Wazir (may have a nom de guerre: Muhammad Reda Al-Wazir)	8
6. Sixth person: Yousra Al-Harazi (Activities Coordinator)	9
7. How they serve the militia	10
1.7. Providing inside information and advice	11
2.7. Directing financial resources	11
3.7. Use of pressure lobbying	11
4.7. Coordination of public relations and publicity	11
5.7. Facilitation of meetings and participation	11
6.7. Audit deviation	11
7.7. Undermining humanitarian access	12
8.7. Utilization of Regulatory Resources	12
9.7. Pressure regulators	12
Conclusion	12
References	14

Houthi Secret Organization in International Organizations and Funds

Introduction

This report reviews growing concerns about the presence of individuals closely associated with the Houthi leadership in Yemen within international financial and humanitarian institutions. These individuals, who hold influential positions in these organizations, use their positions to promote and defend Houthi interests, posing a threat to the integrity and neutrality of these institutions.

The report focuses on six key people identified through open-source research, who play important roles in international institutions, requiring increased scrutiny and response from relevant organizations. The report details how these individuals are using their positions to serve the Houthi agenda through:

- Provide inside information,
- Directing financial resources,
- use of pressure lobbying,
- coordination of public relations and publicity.
- In addition, the report highlights the impact of these activities on humanitarian access and undermines transparency and accountability in international processes.

What is surprising when researching is that these individuals have been operating since the beginning of the war in Yemen without any role in exposing them or confronting them and stopping them by the concerned authorities in the legitimate government, which is responsible for dealing with international organizations and funds, and mainly includes:

- Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation
- Ministry of Water and Environment
- Ministry of Social Affairs
- Ministry of Finance
- Prime Minister's Office.

The current situation requires intervention from the Presidential Council to correct the work of these entities and ensure accountability. There is also a need for urgent action by the relevant authorities, whether security or specialized, to guarantee the integrity and impartiality of international institutions and to counter the influence of the Houthis within them.

1. First person: Fouad Ali Al-Kohlani



Fouad Ali Al-Kohlani is currently a Senior Advisor to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and advises the IMF Managing Director (1, 2). His promotion to this senior advisory role warrants examination. The documents show that he previously served as Commercial Attaché at the Yemeni Embassy in Washington, D.C. from 2007-2011. (3)

More worryingly, Fouad Ali Al-Kohlani's father serves as assistant defense minister for the Houthi (4) **group**, which has been embroiled in a violent conflict with the legitimate Yemeni government and the Saudi-led coalition since 2015. In addition, most members of the extended Kohlani family hold leadership positions within the Houthi movement.

During the IMF's 2021 meeting with Yemeni Finance Minister Bin Breik (5), Fouad was present in his role to provide advice to the Director of the International Monetary Fund, raising legitimate concerns about conflicts of interest and potential bias. The IMF must address how a senior advisor oversees matters directly related to the legitimate government while it is in conflict with Fouad's father's extremist organization. Fouad's influence on IMF policy and decision-making processes concerning Yemen requires deeper review.

2. The second person: Safaa Ali Qasim Almoayad



Safaa Almoayad serves as a poverty and equity advisor at the World Bank (6, 7), a position that once again brings potential conflicts of interest. Her London-based cousin Ahmed Al-Moayad speaks out actively as a media representative for the Houthis (8), while her sister Nada is married to the owner of Prodigy, which is known to have provided support to the Houthis (9).

The nature of Safaa Al-Moayad's relationship with Fouad Al-Kohlani in terms of first- or second-degree relatives requires clarification, as any family ties would exacerbate conflicts of interest issues. Safaa allegedly helped Prodigy secure World Bank contracts, presumably benefiting her extended family and the Houthis. The World Bank must respond to these circulating allegations.

Attached is one of the documents of the Supreme Council for Relief of the Houthis regarding the emergency cash transfer project for Yemen funded by the World Bank and the assignment of Prodigy to evaluate



3. Third person: Angham Hassan Al-Shami



Angham Al-Shami holds a senior media position in the IMF's Communications Department (10, 11, 12). Among her relatives are individuals who hold prominent positions within the Houthi security apparatus in Yemen (13).

Prior to joining the IMF, Angham served as Deputy Commercial Attaché at the Yemeni Embassy in the United States from 2009 to 2011,[14] under the direct supervision of Fouad Al-Kohlani, who was also a commercial attaché and then became the IMF's Senior Advisor in Washington.

Analysis of her digital footprint suggests that she may have implicitly supported Houthi propaganda efforts on social media during the peak of the conflict in Yemen (15). Attached are the references to one of her accounts on platform X during the conflict, which was subsequently closed later.



Here, the IMF must address how such a politically connected person was appointed to a strategic communications role without following due legal procedures to vet potential conflicts. Her work requires a review of any dissemination of Houthi positions that undermine the IMF's independence and neutrality.

4. Fourth person: Ahmed Al-Shami



Ahmed Al-Shami serves as a spokesman and economic advisor to the Houthi militia (16, 17) while serving as executive director of the Arab Organization for Human Rights (18), ostensibly a neutral advocacy body registered in the United States. Evidence shows that this organization served as a façade facilitating Houthi engagement with international bodies such as the United Nations.

Al-Shami facilitates meetings and provides statements that help the Houthi cause through his dubious human rights and cooperative work group, the Arab Organization for Human Rights, known as "ARWA", registered in America in 2016 in Washington State (19, 20). It also maintains close ties with other entities in the West that support Iran-backed propaganda.

He attends the meetings of the Human Rights Council in Geneva through this interface, and holds multiple meetings with members of parliaments in America, Britain and the European Union (21, 22, 23), and works closely with the UN envoy to Yemen through his representation of this organization despite being an official spokesman for the Houthis, which shows an exciting contradiction and international and international cover-up.

UN agencies and participating organizations must respond to allegations of engagement of parties with clear allegations of loyalty to one side of Yemen's ongoing internal conflict. These partnerships threaten the principles of neutrality and transparency and block humanitarian access.

Al-Shami also participates with a number of institutions that have been previously warned, which are considered soft hands for the Houthis in the West, such as DeepRoot for Raafat Al-Akhali, who faces legal charges of infidelity from justice and refusal to attend the Marib court, and we note multiple activities with

them in America and Europe and enter him on behalf of his American human rights organization, and also within the training courses for the Hikmat program of Al-Akhali's wife, Abeer Al-Mutawakel (24), as well as workshops and meetings (25) These institutions are working to embellish the image of the Houthis militia in the West, and here it is clear that they are linked to figures affiliated with the Houthi militia, and this shows hidden cooperation through various activities.

5. Fifth person: Muhammad Al-Wazir (has a name that may be nom de guerre Muhammad Reda Al-Wazir)



A Houthi leader for international coordination, and a founding partner with Ahmed Al-Shami of the Arab Organization for Human Rights "Arwa ARWA" (previous reference 22), where, as we mentioned earlier, they established it in America in Columbia County, Washington in 2016, and this center or organization is one of the soft Houthi hands and the face of public relations for the Houthis in America and within international organizations, whether in Warba or America. Among the relatives of the Houthi leaders is Ismail Ibrahim Al-Wazir, Deputy Minister of Justice of the Houthis (26)

Mohammed Al-Wazir participated in many meetings of the Human Rights Council in Geneva on behalf of the organization, as well as in partnership with an organization called the Iraqi Development Organization (IDO) and with the support of an organization called Americans for Democracy and Human Rights in Bahrain (ADHRB) (27).

In fact, in one of the meetings, coordination was arranged for Abdelqader Al-Murtada, a Houthi leader and the head of the prisoner file for the Houthis, to deliver a speech at the Human Rights Council via a recorded

video on the internet (28), Al-Murtada is considered one of those responsible for torturing prisoners in Houthi militia prisons, with numerous testimonies from released prisoners confirming they were tortured by Abdelqader Al-Murtada (29). This is a serious issue, involving corruption and the empowerment of a war criminal, as well as bias and manipulation against the legitimate government and the international community. Through this American human rights organization, which acts as a cover for the Houthis, Mohamed Reza Al-Wazir and Ahmed Al-Shami have managed to hold numerous meetings and facilitate the participation of Yemeni civil society organizations that support the Houthis in Geneva meetings, including the Insan organization (previous reference 28).

6. Sixth person : ARWA Activities Coordinator in Geneva (Yousra Al-Harazi)



Speaker and coordinator of activities in Geneva, Switzerland for the Arab Organization for Human Rights (ARWA) affiliated with Mohammed Reda Al-Wazir and Ahmed Al-Shami, US Houthi leaders. (30)

It also delivers speeches at the Human Rights Council in Geneva on behalf of the organization and other parties that follow, support or share them, but with a different name, such as the Iraqi Development Organization Iraq Development Organization (IDO) as well as Americans for Democracy and Human Rights in Bahrain (ADHRB) (see previous reference 27)

As mentioned earlier, Mohammed Reda Al-Wazir and Ahmed al-Shami participate in many meetings of the Human Rights Council in Geneva on behalf of the organization, while at the same time they are Houthi leaders with American citizenship, and of course along with Yousra Al-Harazi.

Overall, these cases demonstrate the strategic priority of infiltrating influential international platforms by placing sympathetic family members in positions of influence with conflicting interests. Their roles provide avenues for allocating resources, exerting pressure on soft power, and normalizing a rebel group that controls Yemen's capital through violence.

There is a need for robust reforms to strengthen ethical frameworks and prevent the political exploitation of international institutions. All organizations employing such individuals should conduct independent investigations to ensure neutrality and restore affected public trust. The humanitarian needs of the Yemeni people must take precedence over any political agenda. Additionally, the legitimate government and the Presidential Council must reconsider the representatives of legitimacy in international organizations and hold accountable those who covered up the presence of such individuals and how they contributed to supporting the Houthi militia throughout the war.

7. How they serve the militia

During the period (2015-2023), Yemen received up to \$ 31 billion in humanitarian aid due to the war from international donors through international organizations and funds, but this figure unfortunately did not benefit the Yemeni people and was receiving crumbs from it, as well as expired or spoiled food, in light of large operational budgets for international organizations and their partners exceeding 50% in many projects, in addition to the clear complicity of these organizations with the Houthi militia, which enabled the Houthis to control all joints Projects related to these financings and benefiting from them and taking different percentages and manipulating the exchange rate of the Yemeni currency in partnership with these organizations and this service continued throughout these past years.

Here are some ways the individuals mentioned in the report can serve the interests of the Houthi militia through their roles in international organizations:

1.7. Providing inside information and advising:

Individuals can provide the Houthis with inside information and advise them on the policies and positions of employers, such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the United Nations. This helps the militia navigate interactions and opportunities for engagement and influence.

2.7. Directing Financial Resources:

These individuals may redirect financial resources from donor-funded projects and contracts to Houthi-linked individuals and companies such as Prodigy. This practice drains funds earmarked for humanitarian aid.

3.7. Use of pressure lobbying:

They can use their platforms to lobby unintended partners within the UN and NGOs, advance a narrative that legitimizes the Houthis as a governing authority, and softens their rebellious character.

4.7. Coordination of Public Relations and Publicity:

With the help of media and communications staff, these individuals can coordinate PR and publicity efforts. This would spread Houthi talking points while undermining the legitimate government.

5.7. Facilitation of meetings and participation:

They can facilitate the meetings and participation of individuals and other entities allied with the Houthis in UN and NGO operations and mechanisms, helping to expand the militia's international networks.

6.7. Audit deviation:

These individuals may divert scrutiny away from Houthi abuses and human rights abuses through biased advocacy and selective framing of issues that favor the militia's political agenda.

7.7. Undermining humanitarian access:

If involved in the implementation of the project, it could undermine humanitarian access and intervention monitoring, creating opportunities for revenue misappropriation, arms smuggling, and other illicit activities.

8.7. Utilization of Organizational Resources:

They can use organizational resources and travel privileges for purposes beyond their official responsibilities, such as intelligence gathering and logistical coordination.

9.7. Pressure regulators:

Finally, they may pressure organizations employing relatives to take positions aligned with Houthi interests. This can be done through implicit threats related to the safety of employees if their demands are not met.

Conclusion

In conclusion, this investigation uncovered deeply troubling evidence that individuals closely associated with the Houthi leadership were able to infiltrate key positions within important international humanitarian and financial organizations.

The presence of such politically affiliated Houthi militia personnel who serve in these roles fundamentally undermines the principles of independence, impartiality, and impartiality that these institutions are designed and relied upon to support. It creates legitimate doubts about the ability of international institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank, and UN agencies to make objective and impartial assessments and decisions on Yemen.

If left unaddressed, this situation risks normalization with a rebel terrorist militia by abusing the multi-party programs of respected actors. It allows strategic political interests to replace the principles of justice, accountability and mitigation of civilian harm.

Moreover, the potential channels of Houthi influence over policies and resource flows provided by these conflicting roles raise serious questions about whether the humanitarian and protection priorities of the vulnerable Yemeni people are at risk to serve an armed terrorist group's political agenda.

Prompt and transparent investigations should be conducted to conduct a thorough review of possible misconduct, biases, and disputes in these cases. Strong reforms are also needed to close exploited gaps and prevent future position infiltration of organizations through rigorous examination of conflicts of interest and abuse of influence and functions. The actors of the legitimate government should reconsider their representatives in international organizations, funds and focal points, and conduct an audit and accountability for those who participated or covered such behavior, which negatively affected the legitimacy representing the Yemeni people.

Overall, restoring credibility and focusing on alleviating the suffering of Yemenis in accordance with humanitarian principles requires international organizations to take serious measures to ensure that their independence is never tarnished for political purposes. The consequences of inaction or poor response can further damage global humanitarian action at a time when integrity and trust are more vital.

Thanks, and gratitude: to all those who contributed to the disclosure of the facts and helped provide the data, and to everyone who reviewed this report and enriched it with observations.

References

1. http://www.kapp.gov.kw/media/get_details/94
2. https://rocketreach.co/fouad-al-kohlany-email_115207601
3. https://marebpress.net/news_details.php?sid=7591
4. <https://www.26sep.net/index.php/local/58584-2023-06-10-17-38-57>
5. <https://www.pmo-ye.net/post/1013>
6. <https://live.albankaldawli.org/ar/event/2023/ending-gender-based-violence-10-year-retrospective>
7. <https://documents.worldbank.org/en/publication/documents-reports/documentdetail/099013503152313290/p1778260aba0620db0af78080c35c07432d>
8. <https://x.com/ahmd725971/status/1799557304657862816>
9. <https://alnkkar.com/news5438.html>
10. <https://www.imf.org/ar/News/Articles/2024/01/23/pr2421-omn-imf-executive-board-concludes-2023-article-iv-consultation-with-oman>
11. <https://www.linkedin.com/in/angham-al-shami-33521915/>
12. https://rocketreach.co/angham-al-shami-email_19511935
13. <https://www.alyoum8.net/posts/93787>
14. <https://www.linkedin.com/in/angham-al-shami-476a1415/>
15. https://rocketreach.co/angham-al-shami-email_19511935
16. <https://m.sa24.co/article/2496341/%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%B6%D9%8A%D8%AD-%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B6%D9%88-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%86%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%82%D8%AA%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A3%D8%AD%D9%85%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%8A.html>
17. https://www.almayadeen.net/episodes/729204/_%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A2%D8%AB%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%82%D8%AA%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%84%D9%84%D8%BA%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D8%B9%D9%88%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%85%D9%86?fbclid=IwZXh0bgNhZW0CMTAAAR2j6IsM6lVpLSIxyVUjq8J-1zDAQSv5OcNcngpd nnXo5K STc3dy7Bw aem AT7Ti02OQQf z43EUr2rIpUfcEfyZLYmmLSq_8hXDqlbJedXrLkh20XbU7uF01WYNT9WTXhS6DrQG783EPH9W2b4
18. <https://www.linkedin.com/in/ahmed-alshami-870baa14/>
19. <https://arwarights.org/unhrc>
20. <https://www.salary.com/research/company/arabian-rights-watch-association-overview>
21. <https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/9358080/labour-mp-anti-semitism-storm/>
22. <https://www.aei.org/foreign-and-defense-policy/middle-east/how-houthi-activists-hijack-the-human-rights-mantle/>
23. <https://2009-2017.state.gov/e/eb/occd/usncp/specificinstance/finalstatements/264328.htm>

24. <https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=397772148641064&set=a.220799373005010>
25. https://arabcenterdc.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/Conference-Booklet_The-Conflict-in-Yemen_Current-Situation-and-Future-Prospects.pdf
26. <https://www.saba.ye/ar/news3163845.htm>
27. <https://arwarights.org/unhrc>
28. <https://www.adhrb.org/2019/03/adhrb-side-event-hrc40-five-years-systemic-violations-yemen/>
29. <https://taiztime.com/hot-news/2023-05-04-07-57-01>
30. <https://thewallwillfall.org/2016/03/18/yemen-saudi-led-coalition-destruction-of-heritage-and-history/>
31. One of the links of the #وين_الفلوس campaign that dealt with the series of relatives of Houthi leaders in international organizations on **Facebook (Facebook)**:
<https://www.facebook.com/share/p/kkYjF7PxmMgnMH4x/?mibextid=oFDknk>
32. One of the links of the #وين_الفلوس campaign, which dealt with the series of relatives of Houthi leaders in international organizations on the **XX platform** :
https://x.com/AlkharrazDr/status/1801982501734559871?t=-fH_KMnleWt07Ekozfl-dg&s=19